1. For background information on the emerging professional field of elder law, see generally National Association of Elder Law Attorneys, www.naela.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2010) and the other essays in this publication.
2. The terms "competence" and "capacity" frequently are used interchangeably in common parlance. However, the two terms technically refer to distinct concepts. Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 92 (2008) . As used in this essay, "competence" refers to a formal adjudication by a court or other authorized judicial or administrative body regarding the legal authority of an individual to make decisions with legal consequences. By contrast, "capacity" refers to a clinical, extralegal working impression concerning a person's ability to engage in a rational decision-making process. "A capacity assessment is a clinical assessment." Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON LAW & AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, delirium 10 (the "three D's"), and various psychoses 11 -typically are seen and treated by the older person's primary care physician.
In addition to the fact-provider role, the treating physician also may be solicited to provide an expert opinion, based upon that physician's direct experience with the allegedly incompetent person, regarding that person's present or previous 12 ability to make decisions, for purposes of having that opinion admitted and considered within a legal setting. 13 Further, an attorney may seek a treating physician's records as a partial basis for the formulation of an expert opinion about the competence of the alleged incompetent person when the expert opinion is to be rendered by a non-treating physician employed by the attorney for forensic purposes. 14 see Sjef Gevers, Dementia and the Law, 13 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 209, 211-16 (2006) (examining a variety of important issues related to dementia including "the availability of provision of care" and "treatment and non treatment decisions.").
9. PSYCHIATRY 722, 722 (2007) (noting that "the high prevalence of cognitive impairment and dementia in older adults creates a fertile environment for challenges to wills").
13. Regarding the role of expert opinion evidence, see generally 2 AM. JUR. Trials § 585 (2009) (offering guidance with regard to issues such as the use, selection, and compensation of expert witnesses).
14. The term "forensic" refers to the application of scientific (including medical) expertise, through the preparation of reports, to help resolve legal issues. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "forensic" as "used in or suitable to courts of law or public debate").
Attorneys' retention of expert consultants 15 specifically for forensic evaluations (that is, specifically to generate expert opinion testimony for presentation to the court or other legal forum) raises a panoply of challenges for legal practitioners 16 and the courts, 17 a comprehensive discussion of which would go beyond the scope of the present essay.
Rather, this essay concentrates on the professional relationship present between the elder law attorney who is involved in a situation in which the decision-making competence of an older person is questioned, on one side, and the treating physician of the same older person, on the other.
Competence is a "socio-legal construct" 18 and, within the boundaries of that construct, a competence determination involves the "intersection of legal doctrine, behavioral science research, and clinical practice."
19 The attorney-physician interaction in this arena frequently is less than ideal. Rather, this essay offers the author's own reflections and impressions formulated on the basis of his particular professional experience as an academic attorney who has worked for many years in medical educational environments, supplemented by his individual conversations with a small convenience sample of experienced physicians conducted for purposes of this project.
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The explanations and suggestions that follow should be understood and evaluated with this caveat in mind.
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE INTERPROFESSIONAL TENSION
There is an array of plausible explanations for the frequent tension that develops between elder law attorneys and treating physicians in the sphere of decision-making competence determinations. Perhaps most fundamental is the fact that attorneys involved in cases raising questions about decision-making competence identify the pertinent issues and objectives in a very different way than do the treating physicians of an alleged incompetent person:
Both [physician-patient and attorney-client] relationships require professionalism, ethical conduct, extensive skill and training, and confidentiality, yet they are practiced in diametrically dissimilar fashions. Although this description is overly simplistic and entire texts have been devoted to both types of relationship, in the physicianpatient relationship, the physician's job is to prevent, 22. The author thanks the physicians who spoke with him about this project. Because these physicians spoke with the expectation that their comments would only be reported anonymously, they are not acknowledged here by name. diagnose, discover, and, if possible, remedy an illness and alleviate suffering. The legal system is based on an adversarial process; the attorney has an ethical duty to fervently represent a client and attempt to win the case or argument, which is often decided by a third unaffected party: jury, judge, or mediator. Winning may not be synonymous with truth or justice. . . . Even though an argument could be made that neither relationship . . . is ideal or even just, it is telling that they are so different.
23
Treating physicians normally are driven by, and organize the great bulk of their energies and activities around, a therapeutic model focused on the patient's medical welfare. 24 Oriented thusly toward clinical consequences, treating physicians are generally tolerant of "bumbling through," even despite some legal ambiguity, and respect the patient's autonomy so long as medical harm to the patient does not result. 25 Efficiency and flexibility in responding to the medical immediacy of the patient's needs is important to accomplish the physician's patient care function. 26 In the course of treating the patient, the physician ordinarily is not looking for, let alone collecting and documenting, legally admissible evidence, since the patient's legal status rarely will matter in carrying out the physician's job to make the patient "better;" hence, the physician may appear recalcitrant to the attorney not because the physician is intentionally behaving difficultly, but rather just because the physician does not possess the data necessary to answer the question posed by the attorney regarding decision-making competence. By contrast, the elder law attorney likely is influenced by a more forensic, or legal authority clarification oriented, paradigm.
27
This model basically entails a process-orientated intent on obtaining absolute legal certainty regarding the rights and duties of all the respective parties to a medical, financial, or personal transaction. If necessary, that certainty will be achieved through the adversary system. Attorney bias in this direction is based heavily on elder law practitioners' experience working with a skewed sample in which legal bumbling through has not worked very well for vulnerable older clients and other parties with whom those clients have dealt.
28
A second significant factor contributing to attorney-treating physician friction is physician apprehension that the physician's cooperation in a legal process (such as guardianship), which might have the ultimate effect of overriding or limiting the patient's stated wishes, would be interpreted by the patient as a moral betrayal. 29 Physicians worry that such perceived betrayal, especially when it entails the sharing of otherwise confidential patient medical information with third parties, 30 will engender a diminution of trust and thereby destroy or impair continuation of the beneficial physician-patient fiduciary relationship.
31
Additionally, physicians are anxious that their cooperation in a legal process that diminishes the patient's autonomy may be antitherapeutic, hence offensive to the ethical principle of 27. Zane, supra note 23, at 584 (discussing the legal process and how attorneys generally evaluate cases).
28. beneficence, 32 by helping to bring about a legal outcome that (from the patient's own perspective) makes the patient's life worse than it was before. For instance, the physician's assistance to an attorney in establishing a guardianship for a person who has no family, but who vehemently wishes to remain in his or her own home, despite deficits in the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL), 33 might result in the guardian compelling the resisting person to enter an undesired nursing home.
34
Another factor contributing to attorney-treating physician tension in this context is the fact that, in the modern, frequentlyfragmented, uncoordinated American health care non-system, the primary care physician often does not interact with a patient to a great extent during the patient's times of substantial challenge and stress. So long as the patient appears to be reasonably compliant with medical instructions (for example, appearing on time for scheduled appointments independently or assisted by someone else, answering the physician's questions succinctly and affirmatively, and going along without complaint with laboratory tests and physical examinations), the primary care physician rarely generates and memorializes on an ongoing basis the sort of direct evidence regarding a patient's decision-making competence that an attorney would find useful in a legal proceeding. 40 As stated by one pair of commentators:
In the ideal case, the medical record contains a detailed, quantitative assessment of cognitive function on the date at issue. Unfortunately, such records are rare. Almost as useful is the medical record that contains multiple quantitative assessments of cognitive function prior to and after the date in question. . . . But records of this type are also rare.
41
Physicians' inadequate professional education regarding the operation of the legal system generally, and particularly the lack of much or any systematized training to hone forensic diagnostic or documentary skills, 42 are additional factors cited by physicians to help explain their reluctance to get involved with attorneys in cases raising competence questions about present or former patients. To the extent that medical schools and accredited medical residency programs have incorporated into their curricula any attention to the legal and ethical facets of informed patient consent for proposed medical interventions, it is likely that most of that instruction pertains to the informed element of the consent doctrine, 43 with particular emphasis on the tangible, written 39. Sharma et al., supra note 35, at 1671 (discussing in general how lack of continuity between outpatient and inpatient care may lead to a decreased continuity of information 45 Medical students and residents are-at best-only generally familiar with the element of informed consent that requires a competent decision maker and likely receive scant, if any, structured instruction dedicated specifically to improving their knowledge or clinical evaluation skills in the arena of capacity/competence to give medical informed consent. 46 Even less attention is paid in most medical schools and post-graduate training programs to developing future medical practitioners' skills in assessing and documenting patients' decision-making competence for purposes besides obtaining informed consent to medical interventions. (2005) (discussing "the theoretical and practical development of proposed core competencies for subspecialty training and certification in geriatric psychiatry").
50. Donald W. Reynolds Found., www.dwreynolds.org/programs/national /aging/aging.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (stating the foundation's goal is to improve "the quality of life for America's elderly by preparing physicians to provide better care for frail older people.").
51. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/presskits /geriatrics.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) ("Beginning in January 2000, the AAMC managed a $4.8 million grant program for The John A. Hartford Foundation to aid medical schools in the advancement of geriatric and gerontology studies medical schools to enhance the level of geriatrics education for all of their students likely have had the effect of influencing the recipient schools to include more training regarding the clinical evaluation of decision-making capacity and competence in older patients. Despite these important but limited exceptions, however, most treating physicians (particularly primary care providers) are quite uncomfortable with their low degree of educational preparation for the role of evidence supplier in legal contexts involving the questioning of a patient's competence.
52
Another serious source of attorney-physician tension in situations where the physician's assistance is sought in evaluating and proving a client/patient's decision-making competence is the set of anxieties that many physicians sense concerning their own exposure to legal liability for becoming involved in the competence determination process.
53
To a large extent, these physician-held legal anxieties are free-floating and not firmly anchored to any specific, concretely identifiable reason. Instead, fears derive from physicians' general distaste of attorneys, the adversarial system for resolving disagreements, and the process of cross examination in particular. Such fears are not exactly alleviated when attorneys, speaking for their profession, make such public assertions as: "Cross examination is about control. . . .
[T]he focus should not be on the witness, but on the attorney. The witness is nothing more than a trained monkey (a trained, talking monkey that is), confirming or denying the attorney statements."
54 Stated a bit more diplomatically:
The attorney, while presenting evidence, also presents witnesses whose opinions favor their argument in the case. The system is, by definition, adversarial, and therefore both sides collect and organize evidence as it is best presented to further their arguments, including diametrically divergent options from [witnesses]. . . .
Expert witnesses are often the focus of much scrutiny regarding their motivation and the lack of impartiality of their testimony. Finally (although the list of factors enumerated here in no way pretends to be comprehensive), some physicians consider the time commitment and emotional hassles that their involvement with attorneys and the legal system generally entails to be an undesirable distraction from their important medical practices and the therapeutic patient benefit that those medical practices pursue.
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Practicing physicians overwhelmingly characterize themselves as being extremely busy and needing, in the words of one physician I interviewed, to "triage the paperwork to survive." 57 Making matters worse is the unavailability, in most situations, of meaningful financial reimbursement to physicians for the time expenditures and hassle encountered in cooperating with an attorney for the purpose of helping the attorney to definitively clarify the patient's legal status.
III. ADDRESSING THE INTERPROFESSIONAL TENSION
One possible reaction to the present state of affairs would be to maintain the status quo. Although the current level of interaction between elder law attorneys and treating physicians frequently is not ideal in the context of illuminating and clarifying an allegedly incompetent person's legal status and right to make particular kinds of legally significant decisions, both the medical and legal systems in the United States have somehow managed to bumble through for many years without unduly producing either anarchy or oppression.
58
The medical-legal tensions identified in this article are very real, but it still may be best-all things considered-to leave well enough alone.
Despite the inertial predisposition against a serious disruption of the present situation, improvement could be achievable. First, if an insufficiency of physician knowledge and skills regarding the assessment of patients' decision-making competence is indeed a notable problem, then medical schools and postgraduate medical training programs could be incentivized and assisted to include more focused attention on instilling in their students and trainees a 56. See, e.g., id. at better knowledge base and skill set in this sphere. Such efforts might entail development of model curricula and teaching materials and the resolution of questions concerning who would implement the curricula, at what point in the student's or resident's educational career, and using which kinds of formats. Additionally, internal political questions within specific institutions would need to be addressed in order to carve out sufficient curricular time from already overloaded educational schedules and to allocate resources commensurately with the distribution of departmental responsibilities. Even assuming arguendo that these kinds of programmatic details could be satisfactorily resolved, however, there are several reasons one might nonetheless doubt the efficacy of more formal medical education as a panacea for eliminating attorney-physician tension within the process of resolving the legal status of an allegedly incompetent person. To begin, when questions regarding an individual's decision-making capacity enter the legal arena (that is, once questions of capacity transform into issues of competence), particular court practices and procedures-as well as the practices and procedures of specific judges working within the same court system-vary enormously among 59 and within 60 different jurisdictions. No medical education curriculum could reasonably be expected to anticipate and prepare future physicians to respond precisely to such wide variations in judicial and administrative practice. Thus, generic medical education regarding attorneytreating physician interaction in the context of resolving a client's/patient's legal decision-making status has, even at its best, notable inherent limitations in its practical applicability. Moreover, imposing a mandate to include yet more curricular material in already overloaded training programs would (as noted above) potentially create additional political headaches for medical educators. Perhaps most importantly, one might well question the 59. The specific judicial division with authority to adjudicate issues pertaining to individuals' decision-making competence varies depending on the specific jurisdiction. Compare FLA. STAT. § 744.102 (2010) extent to which enhancement of training opportunities in this sphere will, by itself, be robust enough to overcome the several other powerful obstacles outlined earlier 61 to create a more productive attorney-treating physician interaction. Even if treating physicians possess better knowledge about how to be involved in this aspect of the legal process, how likely is it that they will want to be more involved?
If enhancement of medical, including postgraduate, education-however essential such enhancement may be-is not likely to be sufficient, and the other inhibiting factors cannot realistically be eliminated, how then can elder law attorneys in the future work to improve the quality of attorney-treating physician cooperation in the context of resolving decision-making competence issues? One fairly easily implementable suggestion is that elder law attorneys develop a straightforward written glossary of relevant legal terms, attentive to the idiosyncrasies of each attorney's own jurisdiction, to make available to the treating physicians from whom they solicit client-specific information. With the help of such a resource, all of the involved professionals would be working with a shared vocabulary and a lot of initial confusion and cross-purpose efforts could be curtailed. State and local bar association elder law committees could use groundbreaking work done by the American Bar Association and its partners as a starting point for producing such materials.
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Another recommendation would be for the attorney to frame information requests to the treating physician that focus on decision-specific abilities of the alleged incompetent person (namely: Does the person meet the competence criteria for autonomously making the specific decision at issue?), 63 64. Regarding the areas of cognitive and emotional functioning encompassed by the concept of decision-making competence, see for example, Karlawish, supra note 2, at 93. incompetent persons, geared to a specific set of circumstances and places, and accompanied by a clear explanation of why the competence inquiry is being posed at this time, are more likely to produce physician responses with meaningful evidentiary value. 65 Additionally, elder law attorneys should resist the natural inclination to ask treating physicians, even within decision-specific frameworks, for a single, all-encompassing clinical-legal conclusion. Instead, treating physicians' responses to attorneys' requests for opinions about a patient's decision-specific, decision-making competence may be more worthwhile for the requesting attorney and the legal body resolving the matter when the attorney guides the physician to support conclusions with relatively brief answers to a series of questions that break the competence evaluation into its separate data components. Namely, the separate components are: the individual's ability to make and communicate any discernible choice; the individual's ability to comprehend his or her own specific situation; the person's ability to reason with the available information in reaching a decision; and the individual's ability to appreciate the probable and possible consequences of the alternatives being contemplated.
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Many physicians may be better able, and more willing, to deal with attorneys at that concrete level of analysis and explanation than they would be to offer broad, undifferentiated conclusions regarding a particular patient's decision-making competence.
A further potential avenue of positive interprofessional synergy might entail attempts by attorneys dealing with questions of an individual's mental competence to use treating physicians to help pursue clinical or therapeutic interventions, as opposed to legal or adversarial ones, on behalf of the person about whom decisionmaking competence questions have been expressed.
There are many situations that are not adversarial, in which the attorney, client, and family are all seeking to serve the client's interests and to maximize capacity and autonomy. One important result of a capacity assessment may be specific recommendations for clinical interventions that may be recommended by the lawyer and pursued by the client and family to improve or stabilize the client's functioning. For example, in the case of the older client who has become delusional in the context of a hearing impairment, isolation, and anxiety, clinical interventions to address all three (hearing aids, more social contact, anti-anxiety medication) may very well reduce or eliminate delusions and restore the individual's capacity. In other situations, more frequent oversight and assistance with nutrition and medication may increase the client's lucidity. 67 If these collaborative efforts are successful, the need for a formal competence evaluation by the treating physician, an expert consultant, and the court may be obviated or, at the least, delayed. Fulfilling a therapeutic role on behalf of the individual patient is the natural historical fit for treating physicians, 68 just as the costs and benefits of any contemplated intervention-that is, the net therapeutic impact-for each of the proper parties in a scenario should be a paramount consideration for the legal system and its cast of professional actors.
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IV. CONCLUSION Whatever else might accurately be predicted about the practice of elder law in the next part of the twenty-first century, it will be imperative for attorneys in this developing professional specialty to learn to work more collaboratively with medical practitioners in a panoply of contexts that hold ramifications for the health and legal well-being of older people who are both attorneys' clients and physicians' patients. One of those contexts involves situations in which an older person's cognitive and emotional ability to make specific kinds of important, legally consequential life choices truly autonomously 70 has been called into 
